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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper, the value of information from visual 
inspections for the seismic emergency management 
of bridges is investigated. One of the major 
problems in the aftermath of an earthquake concerns 
the decision about possible traffic restrictions to 
issue for infrastructures like bridges. The bridge can 
be closed to traffic, it can be kept open, or traffic can 
be restricted in volume or velocity or limited to 
emergency vehicles. Each of these choices implies 
different consequences and corresponding risks. 
The decision regarding traffic restrictions can be 
made based on the so-called prior knowledge, i.e. 
without any information collected on the state of the 
bridge after the seismic event or exploiting 
information from a visual inspection performed after 
the earthquake. Collecting information has a cost, 
therefore it would be important to know, before the 
inspection is performed, if its cost is balanced by the 
benefit it brings in terms of risk reduction. In this 
paper, a procedure based on pre-posterior Bayesian 
analysis (Schaifer&Raiffa, 1961, Faber &Thöns, 
2013) is proposed to quantify the value of 
information from a visual inspection before it is 
performed in a phase of post-earthquake emergency 
management. The procedure has been applied to the 
case study of a two span reinforced concrete bridge 
located in a region at high seismic hazard. 
2 VISUAL INSPECTION SUPPORTED 
TRAFFIC RESTRICTIONS 
 
The general framework of the Value of Information 
analyses applied to management of traffic 
restrictions after a seismic event has been already 
presented in Limongelli et al. (2017). Herein, this 
approach will be briefly recalled in order to make 
the paper self-contained and adapted to the case of 
visual inspections. Figure 1 illustrates the decision 
tree describing this problem. In the decision tree, 
squares denote decision nodes and circles represent 
random outcome nodes (e.g. states of nature or 
outcomes of the visual inspection).  
After the earthquake, the bridge can be in a 
damaged state DSl ranging from no/negligible 
damage DS1, to total collapse DSL with intermediate 
levels corresponding to e.g. light, moderate and 
severe damage. Herein, L=5 damage states are 
considered (see Table 2 in section 3.3) as in Mander 
(1999).  
The inspection, if performed, could result in 
different outcomes, each corresponding to a branch 
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to forecast this benefit before collecting the information exist in classical decision theory, but are seldom 
applied by engineers. In this paper a framework based on the concept of Value of Information (VoI) from the 
pre-posterior Bayesian decision analysis is adopted and applied to the case study of a two span reinforced 
concrete bridge. 
 
of the DS node in the decision tree. Note that these 
outcomes represent a discretization of the 
probability distribution of the damage state.  
The risk connected to the decision on traffic 
restriction TRk (bridge closed TRN, bridge open TR0), 
is proportional to both direct consequences Cd(TRk), 
due to the failure of the bridge (cost of the bridge, 
loss of lives) and indirect consequences Cid(TRk),  
due to the loss of functionality of the bridge and 
related diversion of traffic (user costs, pollution, 
fatalities related to the unavailability of the bridge 
for emergency vehicles). 
The direct component of the risk upon a certain 
traffic restriction (TRk) is then represented by the 
expected value of consequences to the failure event 
as in Eq.(1).  
𝐸[𝐶𝑑(𝑇𝑅𝑘)] = 𝑐𝑑(𝐹|𝑇𝑅𝑘) ∑ 𝑃(𝐹|𝐷𝑆𝑙) ∙ 𝑃(𝐷𝑆𝑙)
𝐿
𝑙=1
 
 (1) 
where 𝑐𝑑(𝐹|𝑇𝑅𝑘) is the direct cost of failure upon 
the introduction of the traffic restriction 
TRk, 𝑃(𝐹|𝐷𝑆𝑙) is the probability of failure upon the 
occurrence of the damage state DSl. and 𝑃(𝐷𝑆𝑙) is 
the probability of occurrence of the damage state 
DSl.  
The direct costs will be zero if the bridge does not 
fail. 
 
  
Figure 1. Decision tree for the bridge upon knowing the earthquake scenario  
 
If the bridge collapses, the corresponding cost is 
given by the cost of the bridge and the cost related to 
fatalities. The latter depends on the probability that a 
given number of persons pass the bridge when it 
collapses. This probability depends on the traffic 
restriction: if the traffic is restricted, a lower number 
of persons is expected to be on the bridge with 
respect to the situation of open bridge. The indirect 
consequences include economic losses due to delays 
and loss of service (e.g. increased travel time, fuel 
consumption), but also fatalities related to delays in 
getting the injured to a hospital, and losses related to 
environment,  i.e. to the increased pollution induced 
by the diversion (Imam & Chryssanthopoulos, 
2012). 
In analogy with the expression in Eq. (1), the 
indirect component of the consequences is given as: 
 
𝐸[𝐶𝑖𝑑(𝑇𝑅𝑘)] = 𝑐𝑖𝑑(𝐹|𝑇𝑅𝑘) ∑ 𝑃(𝐹|𝐷𝑆𝑖) ∙ 𝑃(𝐷𝑆𝑖)
𝐿
𝑙=1
 
 (2) 
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Indirect consequences depend as well on the traffic 
restriction and increase with the amount of traffic 
that is diverted. Therefore, indirect consequences 
reach the maximum value when the bridge is closed 
and are zero when the bridge is open. 
The total risk related to a given traffic restriction is 
thus: 
 
𝐸[𝐶(𝑇𝑅𝑘)] = 𝐸[𝐶𝑑(𝑇𝑅𝑘)] + 𝐸[C𝑖𝑑(𝑇𝑅𝑘)) ]    (3) 
 
The optimal decision is the one that minimizes 
the risk: 
𝑇𝑅∗ = min
𝑘
{𝐸[𝐶(𝑇𝑅𝑘)]}                              (4) 
 
According to the VoI framework (Schaifer & 
Raiffa, 1961, Faber &Thöns, 2013), a decision 
regarding performing a visual inspection to support 
the decision related to traffic restrictions can be 
made. Herein, we consider the simple case where 
only two choices regarding the inspection are 
possible, i.e. performing it or not. These two options 
correspond to the two initial branches of the decision 
tree in Figure 1 and are described in the following 
sections. 
  
2.1 Upper branch of the tree: decision made 
without performing the inspection 
If an inspection is not carried out (branch ‘No 
inspection’), the decision about possible traffic 
restrictions has to be made based only on the 
probability of the different damage states DSl 
available from prior knowledge (i.e. prior analysis).  
The probability of bridge collapse under traffic 
load upon the damage state DSl caused by the 
earthquake will differ according to the chosen traffic 
restriction. The total expected risk connected to one 
action (k-th traffic restriction) is given by  Eq. (5), 
where the probabilities of the damage states are 
computed without information from an inspection 
thus are the prior probabilities 𝑃′(𝐷𝑆𝑖).  
 
𝐸′[ 𝐶(𝑇𝑅𝑘)] = ∑ 𝑐( 𝐹|𝑇𝑅𝑘)
𝐿
𝑙=1 ∙ 𝑃′(𝐹|𝐷𝑆𝑙 , 𝑇𝑅𝑘) ∙
𝑃′(𝐷𝑆𝑖)     (5) 
 
The optimal decision is made by choosing the 
action that corresponds to the lowest expected risk:  
 
𝑇𝑅∗ = min
𝑘
{𝐸′[𝐶(𝑇𝑅𝑘)]}                              (6) 
2.2 Lower branch of the: decision made with the 
inspection  
If a visual inspection is carried out (branch 
‘Visual Inspection’) the decision about the traffic 
restriction can be made accounting for the 
information available from the inspection (posterior 
analysis). Given the outcome Im, the probabilities of 
the damage states 𝑃(𝐷𝑆𝑙) can be computed updating 
the prior probabilities using the Bayes theorem, thus 
they are ‘posterior probabilities’:   
 
𝑃′′(𝐷𝑆𝑙|𝐼𝑚) =
𝑃(𝐼𝑚|𝐷𝑆𝑙)∙𝑃
′(𝐷𝑆𝑙)
∑ 𝑃(𝐼𝑚|𝐷𝑆𝑙)∙𝑃′(𝐷𝑆𝑙)
𝐿
𝑙=1
 (7) 
 
The likelihoods 𝑃(𝐼𝑚|𝐷𝑆𝑙) are calculated on the 
basis of the information collected during the 
inspection. Therefore, with respect to the previous 
case where the inspection was not performed, the 
difference is the knowledge provided by the 
inspection that enters the process of risk estimation 
through the likelihood functions. The posterior value 
of the expected risk associated to the action 
kTR , 
given the information Im  from the inspection, is 
given by: 
𝐸′′[𝐶(𝑇𝑅𝑘|𝐼𝑚)] = ∑ 𝑐( 𝐹|𝑇𝑅𝑘)
𝐿
𝑙=1 ∙ 𝑃(𝐹|𝐷𝑆𝑙 , 𝑇𝑅𝑘) ∙
𝑃′′(𝐷𝑆𝑙|𝐼𝑚) (8) 
 
The optimal action is the one that minimizes the 
expected cost: 
 
𝑇𝑅∗ = min
𝑘
{𝐸′′[𝐶(𝑇𝑅𝑘|𝐼𝑚)]}        (9) 
 
Before performing the inspection, its outcome is 
not known with certainty. Therefore, to evaluate the 
total expected risk corresponding to the decision 
TRk, we have to consider all the possible inspection 
outcomes Im , with m=1,…M.  
The expected cost over all the possible outcomes 
of the inspections for the decision TRk is: 
  
𝐸[𝐶(𝑇𝑅𝑘)] = 𝑐( 𝐹|𝑇𝑅𝑘)(∑ [𝑃(𝐼𝑚) ∙
𝑀
𝑚=1
∑ 𝑃(𝐹|𝐷𝑆𝑙 , 𝑇𝑅𝑘) ∙ 𝑃′′(𝐷𝑆𝑙|𝐼𝑚)
𝐿
𝑙=1 ])  (10) 
 
With 𝑃(𝐼𝑚) =  ∑ 𝑃(𝐼𝑚|𝐷𝑆𝑙)
𝐿
𝑙=1 ∙ 𝑃′(𝐷𝑆𝑙) probability 
of the inspection outcome Im. The conditional 
probabilities 𝑃(𝐼𝑚|𝐷𝑆𝑙)  are probabilities of the 
outcome Im when damage state l has been sustained.  
The optimal action is the one that minimizes the 
overall risk of failure of the bridge under traffic load 
after being damaged by the earthquake: 
𝑇𝑅∗ = min
𝑙
min
𝑘
{𝐸[𝐶(𝑇𝑅𝑘)]} (11) 
2.3 Value of information from visual inspection 
In order to quantify the value added by the 
information from the visual inspection, before 
actually performing it, we have to compare the 
expected costs for the two cases reported in section 
2.1 (risk of a decision without inspection, Eq.(5)) 
and 2.2 (risk of a decision for all possible inspection 
outcomes, Eq. (8)): 
 
𝑉𝑜𝐼 =  𝐸′[𝐶(𝑇𝑅∗)] − 𝐸[𝐶(𝑇𝑅∗)] (12) 
3 THE CASE STUDY 
3.1 The context 
In the following, the best decision over the use of 
a bridge has to be made when an earthquake has just 
occurred. Main assumption is that the bridge is not 
collapsed, but there is substantial uncertainty on its 
capacity, therefore rising the risk for its users. 
However, there is a certain probability that the 
bridge has still enough capacity to withstand traffic 
without jeopardizing human lives. At the same time, 
the bridge can be located in a strategic network for 
the emergency and its closure may involve an even 
higher risk, with respect to its continued use, due to 
delayed emergency operations. 
The context in which the decision shall be made 
is during the emergency phase, therefore it is 
assumed that the intensity of the earthquake (e.g. 
peak ground acceleration, PGA) is known. For the 
specific example a spectral acceleration Sa= 0.5g for 
a period T=1s is considered. 
The decision can be made on the basis of prior 
knowledge about the bridge damage state, or on the 
basis of new information through a visual 
inspection. The last option has a cost that must be 
considered when the decision about the need to 
perform an inspection is made. 
This case study aims at using VoI to quantify the 
value of the information provided by a visual 
inspection prior to its occurrence in the context of 
emergency management. 
3.2 The bridge 
The bridge considered in this example is a two span 
reinforced concrete bridge with the deck skewed 45° 
and not designed according to seismic standards 
(Mander, 1999). The bridge is located on the road 
that connects a village to a hospital (see figure 
Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. The hypothetical configuration for the case study  
 
It is assumed that before the earthquake, the bridge 
is in its original (intact) configuration. The fragility 
curves have been computed according to this 
assumption using the parameter in Mander (1999). 
Other data about the case study are reported in Table 
1. It is underlined that the number reported in Table 
1 are meant to give a reasonable order of magnitude 
of the costs involved. A sensitivity analyses with 
respect to the parameters involved will be needed in 
order to drawn more conclusive results. 
 
Table 1. Data of the problem 
length of the bridge 30m 
soil type soft rock 
daily number of vehicles 18000 
mean number of persons per vehicle 2 
mean velocity of vehicles 60km/h 
length of diversion due to traffic limitations 30km 
cost of fuel 1.5€/l 
value of time per person [Dept Transp. UK] 30€/h 
average value of life [Daniell et al] 3m€/person 
cost of injuries with long term assistance 3m€/person 
total number of fatalities 100 
% fatalities for delayed emergency [Ukai] 5% 
Value of the bridge 30·106 € 
 
3.3 Definition of the damage states (DS).  
Herein the 5 damage states defined in Table 2 
(Mander, 1999) will be considered  
The parameters μc and σc are respectively mean of 
the residual capacity expressed as a percentage of 
the original value, and increment of standard 
deviation over the original value.  
The values of the median spectral acceleration (for a 
reference period T=1s) in [g] corresponding to the 5 
damage states for a standard bridge are reported in 
the 5th column of Table 2 (Mander, 1999). 
Depending on the characteristics of the bridge 
and of the soil, these values are modified to account 
for the specific characteristics of the considered 
bridge (deck skew, number of spans, soil type). The 
value of the modified spectral accelerations reported 
in the last column of Table 2 have been computed as 
functions of the relevant values in column 5, 
assuming a soil type ‘soft rock’ and the 
characteristics of the bridge (deck skew, number of 
span) reported in Table 1. With reference to (Mander 
1999) and to the values reported in Table 1, the 
modification factors are: kskew=0.84, k3D=1.16, 
S=1.52. 
 
Table 2. Definition of the damage states DS 
Damage 
State 
di 
ic
  
[%] 
ic
  
[%] 
ai 
[g] 
Ai 
[g] 
DS1 no damage 100 0 0 0 
DS2 slight 98 0.05 0.26 0.17 
DS3 moderate 92 0.3 0.35 0.22 
DS4 extensive 75 7.5 0.44 0.28 
DS5 complete 30 15 0.65 0.42 
3.4 Fragility curves and prior probabilities 
 
A fragility curve represents the conditional 
probabilities that the damage state (DS) exceeds a 
certain level (corresponding to a limit damage state 
di), given the value of the intensity measure (e.g. 
Spectral Acceleration Sa at a reference period here 
assumed to be T=1s): 
 
id a i a
F S P DS d S      (13) 
The most common form of a seismic fragility 
function is the standard lognormal cumulative 
distribution (Mander, 1999): 
 
1
ln
i
a
a
d i
S
F S
A
  
    
   
   (14) 
where the spectral acceleration amplitude Ai (for a 
period T=1s) is the parameter describing the 
intensity of the ground motion. The parameter βdi is 
the normalized composite log-normal standard 
deviation in the i-th damage state DSl. In Mander 
(1999) a constant value equal to 0.6 is suggested for 
βdi for all di. The fragility curves for the considered 
bridge are reported in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Fragility curves calculated according to Mander 
(1999). 
 
Herein the fragility curves are used to calculate 
the prior probabilities of exceedance associated to 
the damage states DS1 to DS5 as listed in the 3rd 
column of Table 2. They are obtained as differences 
between the probabilities of exceedance of two 
consecutive damage states reported in the 2nd 
column of the table.  
 
Table 3. Probabilities of the damage states DS 
Damage 
State 
Probability of  
exceedance of DS 
P’(DS) 
 
DS1 1.00 0.17 
DS2 0.83 0.15 
DS3 0.68 0.14 
DS4 0.54 0.25 
DS5 0.29 0.29 
3.5 Definition of the capacity in the different 
damage states 
Some simplifying hypothesis are introduced to 
avoid making the example too complex and distract 
the reader from its main meaning. Both traffic load 
and capacity are considered Log-normal distributed 
with distribution parameters calibrated with respect 
to a target safety level. They are not representative 
of a real bridge. The traffic load is represented by 
the total vehicle weight of a truck, since for a bridge 
with 30m span the load is mainly represented by the 
distribution of maxima of single truck weights 
(Steenbergen, 2010).  For the considered two span 
bridge, we assume a traffic load q with Log-normal 
distribution with mean value of 25t (249kN) and 
coefficient of variation of 20%.  The distribution of 
the capacity is then calibrated according to CEN 
(1990) and Holický et al (1990) for reliability class 3 
(high consequences, bridges and public buildings) as 
Log-normal distributed with mean value equal to 51t 
(507.96kN) and c.o.v. of 8%. This is done assuming 
a linear limit state function 𝑔 = 𝐶 − 𝑄 and a 
minimum reliability index in 50yr equal to 4.3, 
which is equivalent to a minimum reliability index 
of 5.2 in 1 year - i.e. failure probability of 10-7- 
(equivalence on safety level).  
Due to the damage caused by the earthquake, a 
reduction of capacity to withstand traffic load is 
foreseen according to the values in Table 2. 
Considering the new limit state function 𝑔𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖 −
𝑄 where ci is the new capacity at damage state DSi, 
the new probability of failure under the damage state 
can be calculated using the FORM method. The new 
failure probabilities under the damage states 𝐷𝑆𝑖 are 
listed in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Probability of failure for damage states DS 
Damage 
State 
 
in 50yrs 
P(F|DS) 
in 50 yrs 
 
in 1yr 
P(F|DS) 
in 1 yr 
DS1 4.3 8.5·10-6 5.2 9.96·10-8 
DS2 4.17 1.46·10-5 4.99 2.93·10-7 
DS3 3.43 2.91·10-3 4.38 5.83·10-6 
DS4 0.90 0.182 2.65 4.05·10-3 
DS5 -4.24 0.999 0.82 0.204 
3.6 Definition of the traffic restrictions 
The traffic restrictions are herein computed fixing 
the minimum value of reliability index (β) that we 
are willing to accept. Following ISO2394 (1998), we 
consider the value of β=3.1 corresponding to high 
relative costs of safety measures (traffic restrictions) 
and great consequence in case of failure, in cases 
where no specific design life time is given. Herein 
we consider the value of the probability of failure 
corresponding to one year traffic load, despite the 
temporal window in which the decision shall be 
made active is of two weeks after the earthquake. 
Despite the choice of this beta value in the context 
of emergency management may seem arbitrary, this 
assumption is both a simplification, but mostly it is 
necessary since no specific recommendations are 
available for temporary and emergency situations. 
The value of β is used to compute the traffic 
restriction relevant to DS5 which is the state with the 
highest damage, being thus the one that rules the 
traffic restriction aimed to keep the minimum 
accepted reliability. For the target value of β=3.1, 
the new parameters of the distributions of the traffic 
load are listed in  
Table 5 where the values are calculated 
maintaining the initial coefficient of variation of 
20% for the traffic load. The maximum allowable 
weight on the bridge corresponding to each traffic 
restriction, has been computed considering the 
characteristic value of the traffic load (5% 
percentile) scaled for the partial safety factor γC (see 
equation 15) corresponding to lognormal distribution 
of the capacity with VC=0.72, 𝛼𝐶 = 0.98 at DS5 
(Holický et al., 1990).  
 
𝛾𝐶 = 𝑅𝑘 𝑅𝑑⁄ = exp[−1.645𝑉𝐶] exp[−𝛼𝐶𝛽𝑉𝐶]⁄   
 (15) 
 
Table 5. Distribution parameters for traffic load at 
DS5 for the chosen reliability targets 
TR β μq σq % residual traffic 
on mean value 
max load 
[t] 
 
TR1 3.1 10.4 1.86 41.6 4.8 
 
The values of the probability of failure for the 
damage states 1 to 5 when the traffic restrictions 
corresponding to β=3.1 are applied are listed inTable 
6. Due to the imposed traffic restriction to vehicles, 
part of the traffic flow will be redirected to an 
alternative road. Considering a traffic composition 
of 70% of ‘light’ vehicles (length<5m), and a total 
average number of 18000 vehicles per day per traffic 
lane, we can calculate the total number of vehicles 
that is redirected by scaling the initial distribution of 
traffic load (LN(25, 5)). The number of heavy trucks 
redirected for traffic restriction at 4.8t per day per 
lane is 157 (total of 314 on both directions).  
 
Table 6. Probability of failure in 1yr for damage 
states DS with traffic restriction at 4.8t 
Damage State  
in 1yr 
P(F|DS) 
in 1 yr 
DS1 21.7 ~ 0 
DS2 21.2 ~ 0 
DS3 19.5 ~ 0  
DS4 14.9 1.07·10-50 
DS5 3.1 9.68·10-4 
4 CONSEQUENCES 
As remarked Limongelli et al. (2017), 
earthquakes affect larger areas simultaneously. 
Therefore, consequences, e.g. casualties and injuries, 
are not only those directly induced by the failure of 
the bridge, but also those due to the loss of road 
network functionality (e.g. bridge located on a 
critical route to a hospital). To quantify the expected 
number of people in need of hospitalisation in the 
aftermath of an earthquake, a full seismic risk study 
would be needed regarding the entire area the bridge 
is located in and is expected to serve during 
emergency (e.g. to estimate the number of collapsing 
buildings and consequently the number of 
casualties).Furthermore, the economic losses due to 
traffic delays, detours and loss of business can be 
significant. Rigorous analysis of the direct and 
indirect consequences would require the knowledge 
of the complete scenario, including information 
about the infrastructural network the bridge belongs 
to and the vulnerability of the built environment in 
the region served by the bridge. Herein, several 
simplifying assumptions will be done since the aim 
of this application is not obtain a solution for a 
specific problem, but rather to illustrate a possible 
use of Value of Information analysis in the context 
of emergency management. A broad overview of the 
consequences of bridge failure is presented in Imam 
& Chryssanthopoulos (2012). 
 
Table 7 Consequences of bridge failure considered 
(adapted from Imam&Chryssanthopoulos, 2012) 
Category  
Human Deaths 
Injuries 
Economic Replacement costs 
Loss of functionality 
Traffic delay/re-routing 
Environmental CO2 emissions 
NOx emissions 
 
The authors consider the categorization into four 
main groups: human, economic, environmental and 
social. Herein, only the subcategories in Table 7 are 
considered. Social costs have been neglected (e.g. 
reputational damage, diminished public confidence 
in infrastructure, undue changes in professional 
practice). 
4.1 Direct consequences 
Direct consequences of failure consist in bridge 
replacement costs (30m€ according to the data in 
Table 1) and the cost of fatalities depending on the 
adopted traffic restriction. The number of fatalities 
(Daniell et al., 2015) has been computed based on 
the assumption of constant traffic flow during the 
day, corresponding to 0.83 persons passing the 
bridge every second (there is a very small difference 
between TR0 and TR1) according to the assumptions 
in Table 1 over vehicles speed and bridge length. 
Therefore, 1.5persons (rounded to 2) are considered 
on the bridge at the same time (the time interval of 
1.8s needed to pass the bridge).  
 
Table 8. Fatalities due to the collapse of the bridge 
Restriction Cost of fatalities 
TR0 6m€ 
TR1 6m€ 
TRN 0 
4.2 Indirect consequences 
4.2.1 Human 
If the bridge is closed, there could be an increased 
number of fatalities due to delayed emergency 
vehicles. Based on information reported in Ukai 
(1996), a percentage of about 5% of the total 
fatalities is due to crush syndrome (delay in 
emergency treatment. Assuming a total number of 
100 casualties in the village to the earthquake, the 
indirect cost of fatalities due to delayed emergency 
is therefore 15m€. 
4.2.2 Environmental 
Due to the traffic restriction applied to heavy 
trucks, which have to travel longer distance when 
bypassing the bridge, additional environmental 
pollution is foreseen.  
 
Table 9. Average environmental emissions and costs 
for EU trucks 
vehic
le 
Avera
ge 
emissi
on 
NOx 
Unit 
environme
ntal price 
NOx in 
€/kg 
Avera
ge 
emissi
on 
CO2 
Unit 
environme
ntal price 
CO2 in 
€/kg 
Fuel 
consumpt
ion 
 
l/km 
cars 0.8 34.7 120 0.057 0.048 
truck 0.2 34.7 1070 0.057 0.35 
 
Herein, only the pollution from CO2 and NOx 
emission are considered as they are the most harmful 
to human health. The environmental cost can be 
calculated using the average values of unit emissions 
and unit costs for European countries (see Muncrief, 
2016, de Bruin, 2017, Mock, 2017) listed in Table 9. 
The corresponding daily costs due to increased 
pollution for the three considered traffic restrictions 
are listed in Table 10.  
 
Table 10. Daily costs due to increased pollution 
Restriction Cost of pollution 
TR0 0 
TR1 640 
TRN 48167 
4.2.3 Economic 
The economic costs are related to increased fuel 
consumption and to the additional travel time for the 
diversion of 30km. For the three considered traffic 
restrictions and for each day of bridge closure these 
costs are listed in Table 11. 
 
Table 11. Daily economic costs related to fuel 
consumption and user time delay 
Restriction Cost of 
fuel 
Cost of users 
time delay 
Total 
economic 
cost 
TR0 0 0 0 
TR1 148365 9420 157785 
TRN 6735960 1080000 7815960 
5 VOI ANALYSIS 
Referring to the decision tree in Figure 1, the 
prior/posterior/pre-posterior analysis results are 
described in the following. The expected risk for 
each considered decision alternative (bridge open 
TR0, traffic restricted TR1, bridge closed TRN) over 
traffic restriction in prior analysis (branch ‘no 
inspection’ in Figure 1) are reported in Table 12. 
Results in Table 12 show that the traffic restriction 
decision to 4.8t is the best decision because it 
corresponds to the minimum expected consequences 
of 0. 3155 m.€. 
 
Table 12. Expected risk in Prior analysis  
restriction 𝐸′[𝐶(𝑇𝑅𝑘)]  
[m€] 
TR0 2.1579 
TR1  0. 3155 
TRN  22.8641 
 
In order to compute the pre-posterior values of 
the risk connected to the different traffic restriction 
likelihood values 𝑃(𝐼𝑚|𝐷𝑆) are needed in order to 
compute posterior probabilities 𝑃′′(𝐷𝑆𝑙)  according 
to Eq. (7). The likelihoods for each damage state 
have been assumed normal distributed (Estes et al., 
2003) with mean equal to the inspection score in the 
damage state (1,2,…5) and standard deviation equal 
to 1. The last values correspond to the assumption 
that the inspector has enough expertize to be 
erroneously allocating the bridge damage state by 
shifting into maximum one class of inspection score.  
We can now evaluate the expected costs for the three 
decision alternatives before the inspection is 
performed, by considering all possible outcome of 
the inspection (see Eq. (10) & (11)). Results in  
 
 
 
Table 13 show that, also in this case, the traffic 
restriction decision to 4.8t is the best decision 
because it corresponds to the minimum expected 
consequences of 0. 3154 m€. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Expected risks in Pre-Posterior analysis  
restriction 𝐸[𝐶(𝑇𝑅𝑘)]  
m€ 
TR0 2.0153 
TR1 0. 3154 
TRN 22.8641 
 
The Value of Information (VoI) (see 
Schaifer&Raiffa, 1961) can now be computed using 
Eq. (12): 
 
𝑉𝑜𝐼 =  𝐸′[𝐶(𝑇𝑅∗)] − 𝐸[𝐶(𝑇𝑅∗)] =
0.3155𝑚€ − 0.3154€ = 0.001𝑚€                  (16) 
 
The expected value of information is 1000€. 
Therefore, in the specific scenario considered, there 
is a benefit in making the inspection only if the 
inspection costs (including the costs of personnel 
safety) is lower than this value. 
5.1 Conclusions  
In this paper the framework for quantifying the 
value of information proposed in COST Action 
TU1402 has been applied to the case of the post-
earthquake emergency management of a bridge. 
Given a specific earthquake scenario, the value of 
information from visual inspections in the phase of 
the emergency is computed using the Bayesian pre-
posterior approach to decision making. Optimal 
decisions whether to perform an inspection before 
imposing traffic restrictions on a potentially 
damaged structure or take the decision based on the 
prior knowledge on the bridge, provided by the 
fragility curves, is identified by minimizing the 
expected total consequences. For the specific 
scenario considered herein, traffic restriction that 
excludes heavy trucks, but allows emergency 
vehicles is the best solution. The results are of 
course valid in the limited context of the 
hypothetical case study with the declared hypothesis. 
A sensitivity analyses with respect to the considered 
cost related to direct and direct consequences will be 
the object of future research efforts.  
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